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Abstract.  In this paper we study, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between
barter and the indebtedness of Russian firms.  We build a model in which a firm uses barter to
protect its working capital against outside creditors even when barter involves high transaction
costs.  The main innovation of our work is to allow renegotiation between the firm and its
creditors.  If the creditors are rational, they often agree to postpone debt payments in order to
avoid destroying the firm's working capital.  It turns out, however, that even if the firm cannot
ensure it will not divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante
incentives to use barter.  We show that the greater the debt overhang, the more likely the use
of barter, and although the possibility of debt restructuring reduces barter, it does not
eliminate it altogether.  We also discuss the role of the government bond market and weak
bankruptcy legislation.  The firm-level evidence is consistent with the model's predictions.
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1. Introduction
The extent of demonetisation of Russia’s transition economy is striking.  According to the
Russian Economic Barometer, in 1998 about 55% of inter-firm transactions were made
through barter, while the 1998 Institute for the Economy in Transition survey reports a share
of 40% (with another 10% carried out in vecksels).  There are a number of competing theories
offering explanations of the spread of barter in Russia.  The most common explanation is the
liquidity squeeze.  Commander and Mummsen (1998) report that most managers believe the
lack of liquidity to be the major cause of barter.  The other main explanation is that non-
monetary transactions are a strategic choice made by managers.  Karpov (1997) and Gaddy
and Ickes (1998) suggest that barter may be used by managers to hide revenues from outside
owners and creditors (including the tax authorities) and delay restructuring.  In this paper we
will try to reconcile both views in a single model.
5
These two theories (lack of liquidity and the delay in restructuring) are based on very different
assumptions and suggest rather different policy implications.  The liquidity hypothesis is
based on the idea that there is no conflict of interest between managers and investors.  The
managers choose the strategies that are best for the firm.  Barter is involuntary: there is no way
of selling for cash since most of the firm’s customers do not have any.  The managers simply
react to the temporary liquidity problems.  Therefore, if we assume that the lack of liquidity is
the cause of barter, in order to reduce barter it is necessary to loosen monetary policy and
make sure that more credit is injected into firms.
On the other hand, the model underlining the role of the lack of restructuring assumes that
outside investors have little control over managers and cannot make sure that value-enhancing
restructuring is undertaken.  Therefore this theory suggests that barter is a result of poor
corporate governance
6 and until the protection of investors' rights is improved, lending to such
firms will not help to reduce barter.  Managers will continue to divert cash for personal
consumption (e.g. through offshore firms).  Once the cash is taken out of the real sector, the
firms' liquidity constraints are not relaxed, so there is no change in real output.  On the other
hand, the increased consumer demand results in inflation.  Hence, the question of whether
barter should be explained by temporary liquidity shocks or by the strategic behaviour of
managers is not of purely academic interest but has important policy implications, too.
Let us try to provide a consistent formulation of each theory.  The lack of restructuring theory
assumes that non-monetary transactions are less transparent and therefore make transfer
pricing and asset stripping easier for the incumbent management.  The liquidity hypothesis
states that barter is an involuntary response of managers to the lack of cash.  If firm A has to
pay firm B for goods supplied and firm A currently has no cash, A may offer B payment in
kind.  Then B will not be able to pay its own supplier C in cash and will, likewise, have to pay
                                                          
5 Given the extent of demonetisation, it is little wonder that there are quite a few other theories and explanations.
Hendley et al. (1997) refer to poor payment systems and tax evasion, Marin and Schnitzer (1999) and Carlin et
al. (2000) provide evidence that barter can help fight disorganisation, Guriev and Kvassov (2000) show that
market concentration is an important determinant of barter.  Drebentsov and al. (1999) suggest that the main
source of non-monetary transactions is the government's subsidies to inefficient firms.  In this paper, we will
concentrate on the lack of liquidity and the delay in restructuring models, since those are mutually exclusive
while the other theories complement one other.
6 Formally, Russian law provides a rather high degree of investor rights protection.  On the other hand, Gelfer,
Pistor and Raiser (2000) show that what really influence's a firm's ability to raise external finance is not the
legislation in place, but the effectiveness of legal institutions.  See Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2000) for discussion
of the differences between intended and actual performance of bankruptcy procedures in Russia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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C in kind.  Certainly, this logic raises a number of questions.  First, suppose that A has a cash
windfall.  Then A may not want to use it to pay B since A know that B will accept barter
because B knows that C will accept barter etc.  Hence, A may well use the cash for its
personal consumption (see Kuznetsov (2000) and Yakovlev (1999) for a detailed account
from case studies and the evidence in Guriev and Ickes (2000)).  The other question that arises
is why firms do not borrow cash from banks.  The liquidity constraint story implies that the
firms are profitable, and there are enough expected future revenues to make repayment
possible.  However, due to the problem of moral hazard discussed above, there can be no
commitment to repayment.  Moreover, if B owes money to a bank, B may actually prefer A to
pay in kind since the non-monetary transactions are much less transparent for outside
creditors.  This point is at the heart of the lack of restructuring theory:  the liquidity shortage is
endogenous, being a consequence of the poor protection of creditors' rights.
Therefore, these two explanations of barter should not be discussed separately:  the liquidity
shortage is linked to a lack of credit which in turn is related to a lack of investor's control over
managers.  The goal of our paper is to explore the link between debt and barter in the presence
of imperfect institutions.  Many authors have suggested that debt overhang is equivalent to a
"100% tax on monetary transactions" (Hendley et al. (1997)) and therefore provides incentives
for barter.
7  The manager uses barter to avoid the "tax" that would wipe out the firm's working
capital and would therefore result in under-utilisation of capacities.  This means that barter is
actually good since it makes it possible to sustain an efficient output level.  However, the
transaction costs of barter (including legal, search, transportation and storage costs) are high.
It is therefore clear why the same outcome cannot be achieved without barter, namely, why the
creditors would not agree to postpone debt payments.  If the firm only suffers from a
temporary liquidity shortage but is solvent in the long-term, the creditor should agree to re-
finance the debt.  The firm will then have an incentive to sell for cash, use the cash for
purchasing inputs and pay the debt later.  We explicitly model the game with renegotiation
and show that when debt restructuring occurs, it does reduce the incentive to barter.  On the
other hand, the threat of cash diversion by the manager may prevent debt restructuring.
Anticipating the failure of debt restructuring, the manager would then still prefer barter.  This
is the most striking and original feature of the model:  debt renegotiation is not sufficient to
eradicate the barter phenomenon – the risk of cash diversion distorts the creditor’s incentive to
participate in the renegotiation process.
Our model therefore implies that in the presence of a cash diversion risk (similar to the
"transformation risk" introduced in Myers and Rajan (1998)), barter is a serious threat to
outside creditors.  As in most debt overhang models, we take the initial level of debt as given.
On the other hand the results of the model suggest that the rational creditors should avoid
lending to Russian firms until contract enforcement is improved.  This is fairly consistent with
the fact that bank credit is very low in Russia (EBRD (1999)).
8
Our model adds an interesting dimension to the stock of literature dealing with soft budget
                                                          
7 Linz and Krueger (1998) or Aukutsionek (1998) interpret barter as a mechanism used to avoid undue
bankruptcy when barter is due to liquidity shortage in a context of imperfect financial market conditions and of
credit market imperfections.
8 Formally, our model applies to the relationship with outside creditors.  However, it also describes well the
interaction with all creditors whose rights are not protected.  A good example of this is wage arrears.  Workers
(creditors) know that if the manager uses the cash for purposes other than payment of wages due, they will not be
paid.  Therefore they insist the firm pay their wages whenever it has any cash available.  To avoid paying off
wage arrears, managers use barter.  See Earle and Sabirianova (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of wage
arrears in Russia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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constraints.  As shown in G. Roland and E. Berglöf (1998), the soft budget constraint usually
arises because creditors lack the ability to liquidate the indebted firm when it should be
liquidated.  In our model, where only the ex post situation is considered, the creditors would
like to refinance the firm which is productive ex post but the refinancing fails due to a lack of
commitment on the manager's side.  Thus the manager chooses inefficient barter in order to
avoid liquidation.
The empirical section (Section 3) shows that firm-level evidence is consistent with the
model’s predictions.  We use two different data sources :  the Russian Economic Barometer
over 1995-96 on a quarterly basis, and the Institute for the Economy in Transition survey
matched with the Goskomstat dataset for 1996 and 1997.  Section 4 concludes and discusses
the main policy implications.
2. The Model
In this Section, we suggest a simple model that describes the behaviour of a liquidity
constrained firm with outside debt.  The firm faces the following choice:  if it pays off the
debt, it will be stripped of working capital and will not be able to purchase inputs for the next
round of production.  Therefore the firm would rather hide the cash.  One way of doing this is
to sell by barter that has no value to the outside creditor (and thus cannot be expropriated by
the creditor).  Even if barter is costly, it makes it possible to postpone debt payments and
finance another round of production which may then make it possible to pay off the debt.
This explanation of the link between liquidity constraint and barter is not, however, fully
consistent.  Indeed, if the firm is efficient and each additional round of production adds value,
why would the creditor not voluntarily restructure the debt?  Since forgiving/refinancing the
debt should lead to an increased utilisation of the firm's efficient capacities, voluntary
renegotiation would result in the delaying of debt service.  This argument is common in
literature concerning financial contracting in developed countries
9 and debt relief in
developing economies
10, so it is not at all clear why it should not apply to a transition
economy.
We provide two alternative answers to this puzzle.  First, it turns out that even in the presence
of renegotiation, the risk of cash diversion by the firm's manager (so called "transformation
risk") may cause barter to emerge.  Second, if the creditor has access to investment
opportunities that the firm does not have, and if these opportunities yield very high returns, as
in the case of Russia's government bond bubble, the creditor will not be interested in debt
restructuring.
At the core of the model is the lack of effective bankruptcy procedures.  Unlike the
conventional models of debt (Hart, 1995), we assume that the creditor cannot gain control of
the firm's assets if the firm breaches the debt contract.  The assets that the creditor can take
over if debt payments are not made on time are limited to cash; barter payments cannot be
expropriated by the creditor, nor can he replace the manager.
2.1 The setting
There are two agents:  a firm F and an outside creditor C.  F owes C debt D0 > 0.  The firm
has a unit of output and no cash.  The firm may sell the output either for cash or for barter and
                                                          
9 Hart (1995), Ch. 5.
10 See for instance Krugman (1988).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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use the revenue to purchase inputs.  The relative prices in the cash market are better for the
firm than those in the barter market:  barter transactions involve high legal, transportation and
storage costs.  On the other hand, cash revenues can be captured by the creditor while barter
revenues cannot.  Cash revenues are accrued to F’s current account which the creditor can
easily seize.  In-kind payments have no value to the creditor and can only be used as inputs in
F’s production.
F owes C
debt D0
t=1 t=0
F sells m0  for cash
and b for barter,
gets m0 rubles and 
β b units of input
F and C negotiate
P and D1
F pays P, 
buysx units 
of input for 
cash 
F produces
λ (x+β b) 
units of output
F sells output for
cash or barter and
pays D1
Game
ends
Figure 1. Timing.
t=2
There are two periods.
11  The timing is as in Figure 1.  At time t=0, F has a unit of output and
can choose whether to sell it for cash or for barter.  The share of output to be sold for cash is
m0  and the share of output to be sold for barter is b (m0+b≤ 1).  The cash prices of output and
input are normalised to 1:  selling m0 for cash, F gets m0 rubles that can buy m0 units of input.
The relative barter prices for inputs are  β∈ [0,1] where  (1-β ) represents the transaction costs
of barter.  Thus, selling b for barter, F gets β b units of input.  At time t=1, the debt is due.  F
and C observe F’s cash revenues and can renegotiate the contract.  They bargain over a new
contract (P,D1) where P is the payment at time t=1 and D1  is the new debt due at t=2.  If the
renegotiation succeeds, F’s cash balance becomes m1 =m0 – P, and F promises to pay D1 at
t=2.  If the renegotiation fails, C takes P=min{m0,D0} and invests it elsewhere.
 12  In this case,
F only has m1 =m0 – min{m0,D0}=[m0 – D0]+.  The new debt is D1 = D0 – min{m0,D0}=[D0 –
m0]+.
13
After the renegotiations, F buys inputs for cash.  The firm spends  x∈ [0,m1] rubles on inputs,
so that the total amount of inputs the firm can use for production is q = β b + x.
                                                          
11 The two-period setting is chosen to simplify the analysis.  Apparently the finite horizon model or infinite
horizon model with discounting would produce similar results.
12 The existing contract gives C a right to claim D0 but F cannot physically pay more than m0 because of the
liquidity constraint.
13 Hereinafter [⋅ ]+ denotes max{⋅ ,0}.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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The firm has linear technology that converts q units of input into λ q units of output.  The
maximum capacity is one unit of input:  q≤ 1.  Therefore the capacity constraint never binds
since q ≤   b + x  ≤   b + m1 ≤  b + m0 ≤  1.
Once the output λ q is produced, F decides again whether to sell it for cash or for barter.  The
cash revenues m2 ∈  [0, λ q]  can again be confiscated by the creditor if the debt has not yet
been repaid.  The remaining cash is used for consumption by F’s owners.  Then the game
ends.
The gross interest rate in the economy is normalised to 1.  Therefore the creditor’s and the
firm's payoffs are respectively:
U
C=P+min{m2,D1} (1)
and
U
F=m1–x+[m2–D1]+,  ( 2 )
2.2 Assumptions
1. For simplicity's sake we will make a few assumptions concerning the firm's productivity λ
and transaction costs of barter 1–β :
1 < 1/β  < λ  < 2
The first inequality implies that barter is less efficient than money: β  < 1.  The second
inequality states that the firm's productivity is high enough to ensure that even with the
relative prices β , the firm adds value: λβ  > 1.  Together, these two inequalities imply that
the firm adds value to the cash prices as well: λ  > 1.  The last (technical) condition makes
the problem less trivial.  If the firm were too productive λ  > 2, renegotiation would always
postpone debt service.  The gains from another round of production would be so large that
they would always overcome the transformation risk (i.e. F's diversion of cash m1 for
current consumption).
14
2. F has all bargaining power.  This is again a simplifying assumption.  We give all the
bargaining power to the firm in order to show that even if F is the residual claimant, cash
may still be expropriated which would provide incentives for barter.
3. Parties have symmetric information:  creditors are perfectly aware that their rights might
be violated.  The problem we are dealing with is a problem of enforcement, which can be
analysed within the framework of incomplete contracts.  C knows that there is no
mechanism to enforce a contract that obliges F to use cash for buying inputs rather than
for personal consumption.
4. Cash has the same value for both parties but barter can only be used as an input in
production using the technology owned by F.  Technology is inalienable.  Even if F
breaches the debt contract, C cannot take control of the productive assets.
15
                                                          
14 This condition is related to the fact that we only have two periods.  If there were T periods, the constraint
would be λ <T.
15 The conventional explanation of this assumption lies in the inalienable nature of human capital.  Although it
may be applicable to Russia, we have in mind a much bigger problem:  the absence of effective bankruptcy
procedures. In Russia, creditors have a hard time claiming the assets of bankrupt firms (see Sonin and
Zhuravskaya (2000)).  Thus even physical capital is inalienable.  Certainly, it is much easier for creditors to get
hold of liquid assets (cash).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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2.3 The first best
Apparently, the social optimum is to sell for cash, buy one unit of input and produce at
maximum capacity.  In other words, b=0, m0=1, q=1, m2=λ q.  Social welfare equals λ .
There are three potential sources of inefficiency in the model.  First, selling for barter rather
than for cash.  Barter sales involve transaction costs (1–β )b.  The second source of
inefficiency is the failure of debt renegotiations:  if C takes all the cash F has at t=1, F
produces below social optimum q<1, and therefore a dead weight loss (λ -1)(1-q) arises.
The third problem is the cash diversion (transformation) risk:  even if debt payments are
postponed and F keeps some cash, F may prefer to spend it for consumption right away rather
than to purchase inputs.  As in Myers and Rajan (1998) we assume that the more liquid the
asset is, the higher the transformation risk is.  A manager has more discretion in using liquid
assets, and therefore outside investors have less control over the manager the more liquid the
assets are.  The transformation risk often appears in literature on incomplete financial
contracts where the only contractible variable is the payment from one party to the other,
while the levels of inputs and outputs are not contractible.  In our model, the manager can
easily transform cash for his private benefit while the in-kind payments (inputs) can only be
used for production.
The first best can be implemented if there is effective bankruptcy legislation.
16  Indeed, let us
assume for a moment, that Assumption 4 does not hold.  Thus, if F does not pay C, C can
replace the manager and manage the firm himself.  Then F knows that selling for barter will
not help:  if F sells for barter so that there is not enough cash to repay the debt, C takes over.
C uses the inputs b for production, and the previous manager gets nothing.
2.4  No renegotiations
Let us first study what happens if renegotiation at t=1 is not allowed.  We will solve the model
via backward induction.  First, we will find m2 under given x, P, D1, m0 and b.  Second, we
will determine x given P, D1, m0 and b.  Then we will find P and D1, given m0 and b.  Finally,
we will describe the choice of m0 and b.  The ultimate goal of our analysis is to establish to
what extent the choice between money and barter depends on debt D0.
The choice between money and barter at t=2 is trivial.  Since barter can only be used for
production, it makes no sense to sell in the last period for barter.
17 Hence, m2=λ q.
The amount of inputs bought for cash x ∈ [0, m0 – P] is chosen by the firm to maximise
U
F = m0 – P – x +[λ  β b +λ x– D1 ]+.
This function is convex with regard to x.  Therefore the solution must be a corner one:  either
x = 0 or x = m0 – P.  Let us check when F prefers x = m0 – P.  Using all available cash to buy
inputs provides F with a higher payoff whenever [λβ b +λ (m0 – P)– D1]+ ≥  m0 – P +[λβ b –
D1]+.  Since m0 – P ≥  0, this condition is equivalent to:
λβ b – D1+(λ –1)(m0 – P) ≥  0.   (3)
                                                          
16 Formally, another simple solution is to write off the debt.  Certainly, this does not satisfy C's individual
rationality constraint.
17 This is due to the finite horizon setting.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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Let us find the first-period payments P and the second period debt D1.  Since there are no
renegotiations, P =min{m0,D0} and D1=[D0 –m0]+.  Now we can describe the choice between
money and barter.  The firm chooses b and m0 to maximise (2) subject to b+m0≤ 1.  There can
be 2 cases:
1. The firm gets enough cash revenues to pay off the initial debt: m0≥ D0.  In this case P =D0
and D1=0.  Inequality (3) holds, so that x= m0 – P and the firm's payoff (2) becomes U
F = λ
β b +λ (m0 – D0).  Since β <1, the firm is better-off selling for cash as much as possible:
m0=1 and b=0.  Apparently, this case is only possible if D0≤ 1.  F's utility is U
F 
m0=1= λ (1 –
D0).
2. The firm does not have enough cash revenues to repay the debt:  m0 < D0.  It has to pay all
the cash to the creditor:  P =m0, and D1=D0 –m0,, and is left with no cash to buy inputs
x=0.  The firm's payoff (2) becomes U
F = [λβ b + m0 – D0]+.  Since λβ >1, the firm is better-
off selling everything for barter: m0=0 and b=1.  Thus the firm gets U
F 
b=1= [λβ  – D0]+.
Comparing the two cases we see that the firm is better-off selling for barter whenever debt is
sufficiently high (see Figure 2).
Proposition 1. In the model without renegotiation, the firm chooses to sell all its output for
barter U
F 
b=1  ≥  U
F 
m0=1  if and only if  D0 ≥  D
*=λ (1-β )/(λ -1).  Otherwise, the firm sells all its
output for cash.
The Proposition is quite intuitive.  Indeed, if there are no renegotiation, the creditor will seize
all the cash that the firm gets for its sales.  Stripped of the working capital, the firm would not
be able to continue production at a reasonably high level.  In order to protect its working
capital, the firm chooses to hide the revenues from the creditor via selling for barter.
Although inefficient (β <1), barter makes it possible to avoid the expropriation of working
capital while facilitating buying inputs.  Being able to produce in the second period, the firm
gets cash and partially or fully repays the debt.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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U
F
D
* λβ
U
F
m=1
U
F
b=1
Figure 2. Firm's payoff as a function of outside debt in the model without renegotiation.
2.5 The model with renegotiations
The model above assumes that renegotiation is not allowed and that the creditor seizes all the
cash the firm has at t=1.  Apparently, this may be myopic:  by restructuring the debt, the
creditor would encourage the firm to produce more in the next period.  This, in turn, would
increase the creditor's chances of getting his money back.  Debt restructuring may therefore
provide the ex ante incentives for the firm to sell for cash rather than for barter.  F knows that
C will not expropriate all the cash right away, so there is no need to hide revenues in the form
of barter and to pay for the cost of barter.  In this Section, we study a model with renegotiation
and check to which extent renegotiation may help to reduce barter.
Again, we will solve the model via backward induction.  Apparently, the choice of m2 and x
under given P, D1, m0 and b are the same as in the previous Section.  In the second period, F
sells for cash: m2=λ q.  The amount of inputs bought for cash is x = m0 – P whenever (3) holds
and x = 0 otherwise.
Now consider the debt renegotiation. The firm and the creditors bargain on P and D1  to
maximise the joint surplus of F and C at the date t=1.  At this point, the choice between
money and barter m0 and b has already been made, so that the renegotiation only effects the
last period of debt overhang and therefore F's incentives to produce more output.  If P and D1
are such that (3) holds, then F uses the remaining cash - if any is left - to buy inputs and
produce more.  Otherwise the manager immediately diverts the remaining cash for personal
consumption and only uses inputs already bought for barter.  The parties' payoffs calculated at
t=1 are as follows:
1. Inequality (3) holds (no diversion):
U
C =P + min{λβ b +λ (m0 – P), D1}; U
F =[λβ b+λ (m0 – P)– D1]+William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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2. Inequality (3) does not hold (diversion):
U
C =
 P +min{λβ b, D1}; U
F=m0 – P  + [λβ b – D0 + P]+
Since F has all the bargaining power, F chooses P and D1 to maximise U
F subject to the
creditor's participation constraint U
C ≥  m0 + min{λβ b , D0 – m0}.
It is easy to show that case 2 is not relevant.  The aim of renegotiation is to postpone debt
payments to leave some cash for input purchases.  If the firm uses the cash for current
consumption and if x=0, then there is no case for renegotiation.  Thus, the second case will
never occur in equilibrium.  To make sure that it does not happen, the parties will agree on a
contract P, D1 that satisfies the constraint (3) and therefore prevents the firm from diverting
the cash.  Unfortunately, the constraint (3) may be binding which may distort the choice of P ,
D1: the diversion never happens but the threat of diversion may prevent the parties from
achieving the first best.
1 0D
U
F
λ -1 D
** λβ
U
F
m=1
U
F
b=1
Figure 3. Firm's payoff as a function of outside debt in the model with renegotiation.
Formally, F chooses P , D1 to maximise:
[λβ b+λ (m0–P)–D1]+  (4)
subject to (3) and the creditor's individual rationality constraint:
P+ min{λβ b +λ (m0 – P), D1 }≥  m0 + min{λβ b , D0 – m0}.
The solution to this problem is P=(2–λ )
-1[m0 + min{λβ b , D0 – m0}–λβ b–(λ -1)m0]+, D1 = m0 +
min{λβ b , D0 – m0}–P.  Thus, whenever m0 + min{λβ b , D0 – m0}>λβ b+(λ -1)m0,
renegotiation results in  P>0.  Some cash is used to pay off the debt rather than to buy inputs.
This provides F with the wrong incentives:  indeed, selling for cash, F would lose some of its
working capital and therefore would not be able to produce as much as it could if it had sold
its output for barter.  Notice that P>0 holds if and only if constraint (3) is binding
18 – if there
                                                          
18 In particular, if λ > 2 were the case, the condition (3) would not bind, and the solution would always be P=0, D1
= m0 + min{λβ b, D0 – m0}.  If the firm is very productive, renegotiation always postpones debt service:  the gains
of another round of production are so large that they always overcome the transformation risk (i.e. F's diversionWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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were no risk of cash diversion, the parties would postpone all debt payments P=0.  The sub-
optimal outcome P >0 occurs only when constraint (3) is binding
19.
Substituting P, D1 into (4), we obtain the firm's payoff as a function of b and m0
U
F = m0+([λβ b +m0 –D0]+ – (2–λ )m0)–(2–λ )
-1(λ –1)[(2–λ )m0 – [λβ b +m0 –D0]+]+ (5)
The firm chooses b and m0 to maximise (5) subject to b+m0≤ 1.  Apparently, (5) increases with
both b and m0, so that this constraint is binding b+m0=1.  Substituting b=1– m0, we obtain a
convex function of m0.  Therefore the solution is always a corner one:  either sell everything
for cash m0=1 or sell everything for barter m0=0.  If F sells everything for barter it gets U
F
b=1=[λβ –D0]+.  If F sells everything for cash, it gets U
F m0=1= 1+([1 –D0]+– (2–λ ))–(2–λ )
-1(λ –
1)[(2–λ )–[1 –D0]+]+.
Figure 3 shows U
F b=1 and U
F m0=1 as functions of the initial debt D0.  One can easily show that
U
F b=1 > U
F m0=1 if and only if D0 > D
**=(1–λβ (2–λ )) / (λ –1).
Proposition 2.  In the model with renegotiation, the firm chooses to sell all its output for
barter U
F 
b=1 ≥  U
F 
m0=1 if and only if D0≥  D
**=(1–λβ (2–λ )) / (λ –1).  Otherwise, the firm sells
all its output for cash.  In the presence of renegotiation, barter is less likely: D
*<D
**.
The Proposition implies that the introduction of renegotiation makes barter less likely:  if D0 ∈
(D
*,  D
**) barter does not occur in the presence of renegotiation but it would occur if
renegotiation were not allowed.
Thus, renegotiation reduces barter but does not eliminate it altogether.  Why is this?  The key
is the cash diversion risk:  the firm's manager cannot ensure he will not divert cash for current
consumption rather than for purchasing inputs.  The reason why the firm's manager may be
interested in diversion is the remaining debt overhang.  If the debt is rescheduled, and the
second-period debt burden is too high, the firm expects to receive too little of the cash
revenues m2.  Therefore diversion is likely to happen.  Diversion can be prevented by reducing
the second period debt overhang, but this is costly.  To compensate the creditor for the lower
second-period return, F has to pay more in the first period which in turn provides F with the
wrong ex ante incentives:  F knows that it will have to pay something in the first period and
will prefer to have as little cash and as much barter as possible.
2.6 Bubble
The analysis above shows that renegotiation may help to decrease barter.  However,
renegotiation does not always occur.  One explanation is the famous free-rider problem.  If
there are many creditors, then it will be hard for them to agree on the renegotiation outcome
since each of them will want a free ride at the others' expense.  Another important explanation
of the failure of renegotiation to eliminate barter may be the presence of a financial bubble
that pays a high real interest rate.  During 1995-98, the Russian government bond (GKO)
market paid out very high real returns.  Since the bubble burst in August 1998, barter levels
have been steadily decreasing.  We will introduce the GKO market in the following way.
Suppose that the creditor has an investment opportunity that pays off a gross interest rate δ >λ .
The firm does not have access to this opportunity.  At the time of renegotiation, the parties
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of cash m1 for current consumption): the relationships between barter and debt vanish.
19 Constraint (3) assures that the utility derived from buying inputs with all cash available is higher than that
derived from diverting cash and financing all production through barter:  in other words, there is no risk of cash
diversion.  If the constraint is binding, it means that the parties cannot agree on postponing all debt payments,
because a threat of diversion exists.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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expect the following payoffs:
U
C=P+δ
-1min{m2,D1},  U
F=m1–x+[m2–D1]+
Solving the model by backward induction, we obtain the equilibrium which is equivalent in
real terms to the equilibrium without renegotiation.  Indeed, m2=λ q, x= m0 – P if (3) holds and
x=0 otherwise.  The renegotiation ends up with P =min{m0,D0} and D1=[D0 –m0]+.  Indeed, C
is not interested in the second period payments unless F offers δ  second-period rubles for each
first-period one.  But this does not happen:  F's internal rate of return is λ .  Thus, the choice
between money and barter at t=0 is precisely the same as in the model without renegotiation.
Certainly, stripping the firm of its working capital and buying the bonds is locally efficient:
the coalition of F and C makes more money via investing in GKO rather than through buying
inputs and producing.  We should not forget, though, that δ  is not a market rate of return.
Rather, it is a growth rate of a bubble.  The cost of capital in the economy is still normalised
to one, and therefore redirecting the cash from the real sector to the bond market is not
efficient for the economy as a whole.
20
3 Empirical results
3.1 The empirical strategy
The model in Section 2 predicts a positive relationship between the level of outside debt and
the share of barter in sales.  Therefore, controlling for other explanations of barter, we should
expect indebted firms to resort to barter more often.  We run OLS estimates for the share of
barter in sales for two firm-level datasets:  the Russian Economic Barometer (REB) survey
and the Barter in Russian Industrial Firms (BRIF) dataset (IET survey matched with the
Goskomstat database of Russian firms).  The indepedendent variables are debt as a ratio of
annual sales in the beginning of the period, regional and industry dummies, size and share in
exports.
Our theory predicts that the relationship between debt and barter should be observed if the
firm is not too indebted.  If the debt is very high (e.g. D0>λβ ) then barter does not help to
protect the working capital and any further increase in debt does not result in more barter.  We
will therefore run separate tests for the most indebted sub-samples.
We will also control the main alternative explanation of the positive relationship between debt
and barter:  that is that both debt and barter occur mostly in ‘bad’ firms.  In the presence of the
soft budget constraint, credit is allocated to bail out loss-making firms.  E. Berglof and G.
Roland (1998) emphasise the ex post injection of soft credit from banks to firms, which
should be liquidated
21.  As a result, bank credit is allocated to loss makers.  The healthier
firms have little access, if any, to external finance
22; also, they tend to repay debt while loss-
making firms remain indebted.  On the other hand, less productive firms are also less
competitive in the cash market and are doomed to sell their output through the old networks.
                                                          
20 Certainly, this is not a closed and consistent model with rational players:  we have just looked at one end of the
GKO cash flows.  Building a general equilibrium of a Ponzy game is however not the purpose of this paper.  We
can only say that somewhere in the public or private sector, there must have been irrational traders who
supported the high rate of return.
21 The crucial point is that, if the proportion of bad loans is high enough, the ex post benefits of bailing out are
higher than the benefits of liquidation.
22 One reason suggested in S. Brana and M. Maurel (1999) is that in the presence of adverse selection, credit is
rationed, healthier firms do not borrow.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
14
Therefore they sell more through barter.  To control this explanation of the link between barter
and indebtedness, we estimate a system of three simultaneous equations.
In the first equation, we estimate the dependence of indebtedness on productivity (controlling
for size, regional and industry dummies).  We use the following proxies of productivity:  the
decline of the firm’s output over the whole period of transition prior to the year for which we
run the regression, and the rate of capacity utilisation.  Both capture the extent to which the
firm can add value in the market rather than command economy prices.  According to the soft
budget constraint theory, a decrease in productivity should lead to liquidation, but if the
benefit of bailing out is higher for the bank
23, then indebtedness increases.
In the second equation, we estimate the dependence of barter on the rate of capacity utilisation
(again, controlling for other determinants of barter).  This makes it possible to take into
account the fact that less competitive firms are less involved in the cash market and therefore
use barter more freely.
Given these two equations, we test whether the relationship between indebtedness and barter
is still significant.  This is our third equation.
3.2 Data description
The REB is a survey which has been conducted since 1992
24.  On a quarterly basis (REB
quarterly survey), a sub-sample of the survey has been obtained for 1995 and 1996 only.
About 170 to 210 firms considered representative in terms of geographic as well as sector
localisation answer the REB quarterly questionnaire.  An important bias is the predominance
of privatised firms, as opposed to new private firms.  In the 1996 sample, 18% were state-
owned, 26% had a mixed property structure, and 56% were privatised former state-owned-
enterprises.
The variables we used are summarised in Table A1 in the Appendix; they are either expressed
in per cent of a monthly usual current level (br, utc) or with respect to a previous level set
equal to 100 (dt0):
The REB barter variable br is the current share of barter in sales (as a percentage), for each
firm at each time (t varies from t= first quarter of 1995 to t= last quarter of 1996).  The proxy
for indebtedness dt0 is the level of indebtedness towards banks, the level six months ago
being set equal to 100.  The output decline is captured by the capacity utilisation rate utc.  The
higher the utc is the more competitive the firm is in the market economy.
We shall also use the dataset Barter in Russian industrial firms (BRIF) built in the New
Economic School Research Project " Non-Monetary Transactions in Russian Economy ". This
dataset was created by matching the surveys of managers of Russian industrial firms
conducted in 1996-98 by Serguei Tsoukhlo (Institute of Economies in Transition, Moscow)
with the Goskomstat database of Russian firms (Federal Committee of Statistics of Russian
Federation).  Since Goskomstat data was most complete for 1996 and 1997 we ran regressions
for the 1996 and 1997 data.
The barter data included six to seven hundred firms each year.  The barter data is comprised of
                                                          
23 The benefit can be higher if there are strong interdependencies between enterprises (too many to fail), if the
quality of competing projects is poor, if bank develop rent seeking activities for exploiting the softness of
government etc.
24 For a more detailed presentation of the survey, see The Russian Economic Barometer publication, any volume.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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the answers given by firms' managers to the following (eight)  questions: " how much of your
firm's inputs (outputs) were paid in rubles, in dollars, in kind and in promissory notes? " The
Goskomstat database includes compulsory statistical reports that all large and medium-size
firms must submit to the Russian Federal Statistics Committee.  There are over 16 thousand
firms in the database.  However, there are many missing items in the financial accounts.  After
matching barter data with the Goskomstat data we ended up with roughly three hundred
observations in each year among which only about a hundred firms appeared both in 1996 and
1997.
As a proxy of debt we take the firm's total indebtedness in the beginning of the corresponding
year divided.  This variable (sum of line items 610 and 620 in the balance sheet) includes bank
loans (610) and amounts owed to suppliers, subsidiaries, consolidated government, IOU
holders, employees and other creditors (620).
In order to control for other explanations of barter we also include firms' size, export and
market power, as well as regional and industry dummies in our regressions.  As a proxy of
size we take logarithm of annual sales.  As for exports, we include share of exports in sales.
The summary statistics and pairwise correlations are provided in Tables A3 and A4 in the
Appendix.  We also included regional and 2-digit industry dummies.
25  The industry dummies
are described in Table A5.  As for the regions, we have only introduced dummies for Moscow
and seven presidential districts but only Moscow's, Urals' and Siberia's dummies came out
significantly different from the European Russia which we used as the base category.
3.3 Evidence from REB survey
The results of the OLS regressions for barter are presented in the Table 1.  In addition to
indebtedness we also control the firm's size, measured as a number of employees (lab), and
include regional and industry dummies.  When we estimate the effect of indebtedness on the
whole sample, the coefficient is positive but not significant.  Our theory predicts that the
coefficient must be significant if the firms are not too indebted.  We exclude firms with
dt0<200 (16 firms or less than six per cent of the sample) and indeed obtain a positive and
significant coefficient.
Table 1 : OLS regressions with robust standard errors
Barter Whole sample dt0 < 200
dt0 0.011 (0.010) 0.13*** (0.024)
lab 0.003***(0.001) 0.002** (0.001)
Regional and
industry dummies
*** ***
Constant 22.37 ***(6.22) 20.44***(6.62)
N 261 245
R2 0.42 0.41
*** - significance at 1% level, ** - significance at 5% level, * - significance at 10% level
                                                          
25 To make the evidence from the two datasets comparable we have not used 5-digit industry information such as
concentration ratios and consumer goods indexes.  Including them in the regressions does not change the results.
See Guriev and Kvassov (2000) on the effect of these variables on barter.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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Table 2 presents the estimations of the simultaneous equation model.  We do find that when
controlling for the negative relationship between indebtedness and capacity utilisation and the
negative relationship between barter and capacity utilisation, barter still positively and
significantly depends on capacity utilisation.
Table 2 : Simultaneous equation model
Barter Whole sample dt0 < 200
1. Barter
Utc -0.13*** (0.038) -0.13**(0.042)
lab 0.002**(0.0008) 0.003***(0.001)
Regional and
industry dummies
*** ***
Constant 32.68*** (4.88) 29.10***(5.59)
2. Debt
Utc -0.75***(0.22) -0.25**(0.11)
lab 0.015***(0.005) 0.009***(0.003)
Regional and
industry dummies
*** ***
Constant 98.27***(29.76) 59.31***(15.14)
3. Barter
Debt 0.14***(0.04) 0.38***(0.08)
Constant 19.60***(3.92) 5.16 (6.16)
N 286 243
*** - significance at 1% level, ** - significance at 5% level, * - significance at 10% level
The results again support the model.  Less productive firms are more indebted; when a firm
faces an increase in its rate of capacity utilisation, barter decreases; finally the correlation
between indebtedness and barter is positive, as predicted by the model, even controlling for
the first two relationships.  The latter correlation is higher and more consistent in the
simultaneous equation model rather than in OLS regressions.
3.4  Evidence from IET survey
We run OLS regressions for barter for 1996 and 1997.  The results of the estimations are
shown in the Table 3.  As our model predicts, barter positively  and significantly depends on
debt.  Moreover, when we exclude the most indebted firms, the effect becomes stronger and
the coefficient becomes more significant.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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Table 3 : OLS regressions with robust standard errors
Barter 1996
whole sample
1996
debt<1
1997
whole sample
1997
debt<1
Debt 0.06** (0.03) 0.12** (0.06) 0.03** (0.01) 0.17*** (0.05)
Log sales 0.016 (0.011) 0.011 (0.011) 0.007 (0.009) 0.003 (0.010)
Exports -0.20*** (0.07) -0.22*** (0.07) -0.33*** (0.11) -0.39*** (0.14)
Regional and
industry dummies
*** *** *** ***
Constant .05 (0.24) 0.15 (0.24) 0.22 (0.25) 0.25  (0.27)
N 289 275 315 270
R2 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.38
*** - significance at 1% level, ** - significance at 5% level, * - significance at 10% level
Table 4 presents the results of estimations of the simultaneous equation model.  Capacity
utilisation has a negative and significant effect on both debt and barter, but even controlling
for those effects, barter still positively and significantly depends on debt.  Moreover, when the
most indebted firms are excluded, the effect is much stronger.
26
Table 4 : Simultaneous equation model
Barter 1996
whole sample
1996
debt<1
1997
whole sample
1997
debt<1
1. Barter
Utc -0.03**(0.01) -0.05**(0.02) -0.04***(0.02) -0.06***(0.02)
Log sales 0.006(0.007) 0.023(0.010) -0.003(0.007) -0.012 (0.008)
Exports -0.05 (0.05) -0.10* (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) -0.15** (0.07)
Regional and
industry dummies
*** *** *** ***
Constant 0.24*(0.13) -0.09(0.17) 0.50***(0.13) 0.21***(0.15)
2. Debt
Utc -0.12*** (0.04) -0.05** (0.02) -0.30*** (0.11) -0.09***(0.03)
Log sales -0.004 (0.022) 0.024** (0.010) -0.10** (0.04) -0.020* (0.012)
Exports -0.03 (0.14) -0.07 (0.06) 0.83** (0.34) -0.02 (0.11)
Regional and
industry dummies
*** *** *** ***
                                                          
26 We have also run regressions excluding the most productive firms (i.e. firms with the highest  utc) and found
that removing these firms does make the effect stronger as the model predicts.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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Constant 0.27***(0.07) -0.29*(0.17) 2.42**(0.84) -0.10(0.27)
3. Barter
Debt 0.23***(0.07) 0.97***(0.17) 0.11***(0.03) 0.55***(0.15)
Constant 0.32***(0.02) 0.19***(0.04) 0.36***(0.02) 0.28***(0.04)
N 286 273 311 267
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the relationship between indebtedness and barter in Russian
firms.  One interesting feature of the model is that it draws a link between the liquidity
shortage argument and that of poor creditor right protection.  Our model incorporates the
argument that barter helps to protect working capital needed for sustaining production and the
argument that barter comes as a strategic reaction of managers that may be costly for outside
investors.
We explicitly model the possibility of relaxing the liquidity constraint by re-financing debt.
Since the firm has a liquidity rather than a solvency problem, replenishing its working capital
is socially efficient, so debt restructuring should be in the mutual interest of the firm and the
creditors.  However, the creditors face a difficult choice:  postponing too much of the debt
will provide incentives for the manager to divert cash rather than to finance the firm's working
capital. Therefore the lack of any commitment not to divert cash becomes a constraint for debt
restructuring. If debt overhang is too high, the negotiation fails and the debt is not
restructured. This, in turn, provides ex ante incentives for the manager to prefer barter
although barter involves higher transaction costs.
Another explanation for the failure of debt restructuring is the presence of the government
bonds (GKO) bubble in 1995-1998.  If the outside investment opportunity (GKO) yields a
very high real interest rate, creditors will not be interested in refinancing the debt, which in
turns provides managers with the incentives to use barter.
Our empirical analysis supports the predicted positive relationship between indebtedness and
barter.  Which of the two explanations of this relationship (the threat of cash diversion by the
manager or the GKO bubble) is correct?  Both are consistent with macro-economic evidence.
The period of the highest GKO yields coincided with the highest levels of barter.  Moreover,
as the causality test in Brana and Maurel (1999) shows, higher real interest rates caused higher
barter in 1995-98.  On the other hand, the meltdown of August 1998 destroyed the GKO
bubble bringing real interest rates to reasonably low levels.  As one should have expected,
barter has declined, too.  But it has not disappeared altogether and is still much higher than in
other economies.
Our model implies that hardening the bankruptcy procedures would have different effects in
the presence and in the absence of a bubble.  If the bubble is present, lack of bankruptcy leads
to barter, which is definitely less efficient than money, but helps to protect the firm's working
capital.  Barter is a survival strategy that helps firms with high indebtedness to survive and
keep producing.  The returns on production are lower than the GKO yield but since the latter
is the bubble, production may be socially efficient.  On the other hand if there is no bubble,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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lack of effective bankruptcy procedures and creditor rights protection results in barter which is
simply less efficient than monetary exchange.  Our analysis suggests two policies that can
decrease barter: (i) to avoid high-yield debt financing of the budget deficit and (ii) to continue
the efforts to introduce effective bankruptcy procedures and protect creditor rights.
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Appendix: Tables
Table A1 : REB: Summary statistics for the main variables in 1995 and 1996
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
br 24,05 38,11 20,15 25,83 0 0 55 65
utc 57,54 53,97 26,57 26,48 5 15 105 105
dt0 90,40 83,42 87,76 96,94 0 0 800 800
Source: REB quarterly survey, June and December 1995 and 1996.
Table A2. REB: Pairwise correlations in 1995 and 1996
br utc dt0
Year 1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
br 1 1
utc -0,1586 -0,0946 1 1
dt0 0,2505 0,1399 -0,1077 -0,0462 1 1
Source: REB quarterly survey, June and December 1995 and 1996.
Table A3. BRIF: Summary statistics.
Variable Explanation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Barter_96 Share of barter in
sales, 1996
0.37 0.24 0 .83
Barter_97 Share of barter in
sales, 1997
0.42 0.25 0 .83
Debt96 Debt as of Jan 1,
1996 divided by
annual sales
0.28 0.48 0 5.07
Debt97 Debt as of Jan 1,
1996 divided by
annual sales
0.61 2.02 0 31.6
Ls96 Log sales 1996 17.0 1.72 11.1 22.3
Ls97 Log sales 1997 17.0 1.79 9.1 21.6
Export96 Share of export in
sales, 1996
0.084 0.166 0 .97
Export97 Share of export in
sales, 1997
0.063 0.146 0 .97William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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Table A4 BRIF The sample by 2-digit industries
Industry Number of firms
Ind1 Electricity -
Ind2 Fuel 8
Ind3 Ferrous metals 48
Ind4 Non-ferrous metals 17
Ind5 Chemical and petro-chemical 78
Ind6 Machinery 201
Ind7 Pulp and forestry 82
Ind8 Construction materials 76
Ind9 Textile 94
Ind10 Food 101
Ind11 Other 18
Table A5: BRIF Pairwise correlations (*** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes
significance at 5% level)
Barter_96 Debt96 Ls96 Export96
Barter_96 1
Debt96 0.25*** 1
Ls96 0.11 0.10 1
Export96 0.10 0.27*** 0.1836 1
Barter_97 Debt97 ls97 export97
Barter_97 1
Debt97 0.30*** 1
ls97 0.09 0.06 1
Export97 -0.02 0.13** 0.20*** 1William Davidson Institute Working Paper 339
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